

# TIG *Brief*

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1998



## Defining the world's premier air and space force



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# from the top



In the September-October issue of *TIG Brief*, I described efforts to reduce the operations tempo impact of operational readiness inspections by combining evaluations with deployments and exercises, implementing shorter notice to eliminate excessive preparation, and using sampling as an alternative to regularly scheduled inspections. While we are working hard to implement these initiatives, we have also begun a second effort to improve life in the field—a complete overhaul of compliance inspections.

The goal established by the Chief of Staff's Blue Ribbon Commission on Organizational Assessments and Awards was to reduce compliance inspections 30 percent by fiscal year 1999. Your major command inspectors general and I are working to make this a reality. We are challenging every compliance item with a series of four questions: should it be evaluated; can it be evaluated without direct inspection; should it be inspected outside the inspector general system; and, finally, if it must be inspected, can its scope be limited in duration,

frequency, or application?

The first question challenges the basic requirement for oversight—is it required by law, safety, the Air Force or major command strategic plan, or the commander? If the answer is no, evaluation by an outside agency is not required.

The second question looks to find evaluation methods other than inspections. Examples include commander certification, unit self assessments, and data or metrics review. Success here demands trust, accountability, development and use of good metrics, and random sampling for verification. In the past, we have used people-intensive inspections as a crutch for poor metrics and a lack of innovative assessment techniques.

The third question seeks to remove redundancy and to ensure the right people perform the assessment. Some assessments are best done by functional staff assistance visits or by special environmental, safety, or medical teams. Inspector general teams should not repeat these assessments. The right inspectors can do more with metrics, work more quickly, and

recognize best practices to improve the function.

When it's finally determined that an item requires inspector general inspection, we must still challenge its duration, frequency, and application: can we validate a system with six month's or one year's worth of data, can we randomly sample units for compliance, or can inspected units be limited to those that fail against an established metric or self-assessment criteria? These questions help us apply common sense to critical inspection items and prevent institutionalizing items that may require only one-time or occasional review.

The process described above forms the basis of our "overhaul" of compliance inspections. We're challenging every item, old and new, against these standards—congressional, Department of Defense, air staff, and major command requirements included. Your leadership is committed to keeping our Air Force the best in the world. You can help tell us where the process and methods should be improved. ♦

*Richard T. Swope*  
The Inspector General



# Raising the Standard

by Gen. Howell M. Estes III

"You cannot choose your battlefield,  
God does that for you; but you can  
plant a standard where a standard  
never flew."

—Stephen Crane, "The Colors"

Today, as we work to further integrate air and space power into a highly effective air and space force, the inspector general continues to play a key role in defining who and what we are as an air and space force. As the future unfolds, the inspector general will continue to be a vital contributor to our success in evolving into the "Space and Air Force" of the next century. The Space and Air Force of the future will set new standards for air and space superiority, global attack and mobility, precision engagement, agile combat support, and information superiority. The inspector general will verify and validate these standards and assess our ability to execute missions effectively and efficiently in support of our national security objectives. The inspector general will be instrumental in ensuring we continue to be the world's most respected air and space force.

For more than 40 years, Air Force Space Command and its

predecessor commands have maintained our nation's intercontinental ballistic missile forces at a 99 percent alert rate. This outstanding alert rate was a key factor in deterring the threat of nuclear attack against our homeland, but it was not the only factor. The other key component was the foreknowledge of our enemies that America's missile early warning satellites and space-based surveillance systems were always watching, forever vigilant against any hostile missile attack.

The deterrent value of our warning and surveillance systems coupled with the very real threat of massive nuclear retaliation gave our enemies pause and kept the world from the brink of nuclear warfare for more than four decades. The efforts of inspectors general throughout AFSPC and the Air Force were key to verifying and validating, for our enemies and us, that the threat of American retaliation was indeed credible and the chance of surprise

attack impossible. This tradition of excellence continues today.

Today, we are an air and space force providing space services to the nation, our sister services, our allies, and ourselves. Most of what we do falls into two mission areas. The first mission area is called force enhancement but is commonly referred to as space support to the warfighter. Force enhancement functions include space-based navigation and mapping, earth and space weather forecasting, strategic and theater missile warning, satellite communications, and intelligence gathering. This mission area and its five functions migrated to space due to the efficiencies possible by executing these missions from space. After all, space is the ultimate high ground. The push to space continues unabated as we further study and plan for the migration of further Air Force missions to space and our commercial sector leverages past military achievements for



future commercial gain.

The second mission area is termed space forces support and is defined as getting satellites into space and taking care of them once they are there. Successful accomplishment of the space forces support mission ensures America's access to space for today and the future. Of particular focus and importance is the excessive cost of getting things to space today. AFSPC is working hard with industry to reduce the cost to orbit from as much as 50 percent to as little as 10 percent of a satellite's cost. If successful, we will be able to spend the majority of our limited dollars on the mission and not on just getting the mission into space.

The role of the inspector general in both of these mission areas cannot be understated. A Titan IVB rocket costs on order of \$350 million. When mated to a \$1 billion Milstar communications satellite, verification and validation of launch and safety procedures are vital. The experience and expertise of the inspector general are valued assets throughout the entire space operations business. Space and missile operations are expensive and hazardous. Our drive for excellence is not a matter of convenience but a matter of AFSPC being the best in the world at what we do. We cannot tolerate being second best.

In the next century, we will develop the capability to protect the space systems providing these services to the nation. This capability is already a part of AFSPC's assigned mission of space

control. This capability is the enabler for the Space and Air Force to accomplish its first core competency of air and space superiority.

We're well on our way to accomplishing this goal. The Air Force's long-range plan outlines specific tasks and time lines to be met to implement the Space and Air Force of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. However, turning the plan into reality is going to take much work and some "out-of-the-box" thinking and our inspector general is up to the challenge.


We will get there by migrating more missions to space, directing more Air Force science and technology and procurement dollars to space missions, and ensuring affordable access to space. Our ability to implement the Air Force's long-range plan to create a Space and Air Force is of critical importance to the nation. The inspector general will be key to this transition by ensuring sustained top performance of all our units in all of our existing and evolving mission areas.

The inspector general will be working shoulder-to-shoulder with our space warriors to ensure this mission is successfully developed and executed. Whether evaluating the performance of AFSPC's seven space wings comprising 42 units across the globe, or working closely with the inspectors general of U.S. Space Command, North American Aerospace Defense Command, and U.S. Strategic Command, or lending valuable assistance to our other joint and multinational partners, the AFSPC

Inspector General team is at the tip of the spear in our efforts for operational excellence.

As we consider the future direction of our national military strategy and our Space and Air Force role in that strategy, we can conclude that space and air power are pivotal to future success on the battlefield. The future of American warfighting is clearly stated in the Chairman's Joint Vision 2010—a vision which cannot be implemented without space forces linking all members of the joint team, providing the indications and warning and command and control this new way of American warfighting demands for success. Spacepower and airpower are the key enablers for the new way of American warfighting.

The way ahead for AFSPC is clear. The inspector general is now and, will continue to be, a key player on today's air and space force team. The inspector general will ensure our command's ability to "dominate the space dimension of military space operations to protect United States interests and investments in space." The inspector general will be key in validating the "integration of our space forces into warfighting ... across the full spectrum of conflict." ♦



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# Orbital Safety in Air Force Space Command— Managing Risk for Future Space Operations

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“T

oday there are well over 500 satellites operating in space, over 220 of which belong to the United States. For us ... this represents over a \$100 billion investment. Tomorrow ... in the next decade ... *U.S. News and World Report* speculates that another 1,800 satellites will be added. By the year 2000 alone, another \$150 billion investment could be made in space ... . In addition, we need to get a handle on the issue of space debris. I recently read an article by Dr. Robert Kuntz, a space pioneer with over 20 years experience in the space industry, in which he states that ‘there are over 140,000 objects one centimeter or larger being monitored by the Haystack Radar tracking facility.’ This is an indictment on our current disregard of the importance of minimizing orbital debris. The irony is quite clear. We must invest already limited resources in reducing a space environment threat, largely created by man, in order to protect our primary investment in space-based capability. This is an almost ridiculous state of affairs that needs to be corrected soon.” (*Gen. Howell M. Estes, “The Promise of Space,” Space Symposium speech, April 1997*)



Air Force Instruction 91-202, *U.S. Air Force Mishap Prevention Program*, defines orbital safety as "... the activities after orbital insertion, associated with testing and operating space vehicles in orbit or deep space, including reentry, recovery, and disposal." The orbital safety program in the Air Force Space Command is the program conducted by our space operations wings that—beginning with unit orbital safety representatives—is designed to protect personnel and property, public and government, from our orbital operations. Additionally, the program ensures lessons learned will be passed to future space programs and establishes processes for space operators to identify and control risk resulting from orbital system malfunctions. The orbital safety program includes six key areas: collision avoidance, debris minimization, directed energy clearing-house procedures, space vehicle and booster disposal or reentry, space environmental effects, and anomaly monitoring.

Although space operations crews perform continuous anomaly monitoring in day-to-day activities, planned increases in commercial space operations, especially the large numbers of small satellite constellations, will require AFSPC to focus its orbital safety program in a different direction. This new direction

must effectively protect on-orbit and future space assets from possible collision with the "wave" of commercial objects headed for orbit and debris already in space. There are two distinct issues in collision avoidance directly related to orbit: debris in low earth orbit and tracking in the geosynchronous belt.

Debris in low earth orbit will become a particular concern because, according to U.S. figures, 33 commercial launches per year are planned from now until 2010, most involving multiple satellites in already crowded, highly desired orbits. For on-orbit space objects, there is no well defined space debris collision avoidance notification procedure between satellite controllers or owners and space surveillance network tracking stations. This network is responsible for monitoring thousands of orbiting space objects through the space control center and the 1st Command and Control Squadron at Cheyenne Mountain Air Station, Colo.

The network, a combined Army, Navy, Air Force, and Canadian system of ground-based radars and sensors involving 25 worldwide sites, tracks the 8,000 plus orbiting objects ranging in weight from 10 pounds to several tons. Seven percent of these objects are operational satellites—the remainder is debris, anything from spent rocket motors to nuts and bolts that mainly



inhabit the low earth orbit. The network sensors can routinely track objects as small as 10 centimeters, the size of a baseball. Yet, the only true collision avoidance operations are performed during launch activity from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., or Cape Canaveral Air Station, Fla. All manned or unmanned missions require specific separation distances between on-orbit space debris and the newly launched space vehicle. If these minimum safety distances are not met, the launch decision authority will hold and wait for proper clearance. The authority can, however, waive the collision avoidance launch constraint and launch the mission. In addition, the only formal, continuous space traffic control and proximity warning occurs within the Russian space station MIR and space shuttle proximity which the network tracks continuously because both are manned.

The second problem of collision will become acute in the geosynchronous belt where defense support program satellites reside. Under nominal configuration, geosynchronous satellites are separated by 1.25 degrees or 421 nautical miles. While conscientious monitoring minimizes drift between satellites, the threat grows during repositioning of satellites—a regular requirement due to drift—and when monitoring is lax. To date, no known impact has caused the loss of a defense

support program vehicle. However, due to insufficient collision avoidance processes, near misses have not been documented and metrics on defense support program satellite conjunctions have not been gathered in the past. Geosynchronous belt conjunctions, when the covariance matrices of two objects intersect and the resulting probability of collision is greater than zero, are estimated to be on the order of dozens per day. (*Lt. B. Hauboldt, Defense Support Program Orbital Safety Paper, 821 Operation Support Squadron, Buckley Air National Guard Base, Colo., Oct 1996*)

On-orbit collision avoidance has not been a key part of normal operations. As the population of objects intersecting or residing in the geosynchronous belt grows, collision avoidance must become a greater concern in order to preserve the space-based missile warning mission. Collision avoidance support from Cheyenne Mountain's Space Defense Operations Center, otherwise known as SPADOC, and interrange operations at Onizuka Air Station, Sunnyvale, Calif., is not sufficient to meet the needs of defense support program satellite operations. As more complex constellations such as the space-based infrared system—replacement for defense support program satellites—are launched by military and civilian agencies, collision



avoidance operations must also grow to meet our needs of risk management in orbital operations (*Hauboldt, Oct 1996*).

AFSPC's Orbital Safety Program must be structured to protect our resources from manmade and natural hazards in order to continually and effectively control the space medium. The program must employ a risk management framework that helps identify on-orbit collision hazards and then develop the controls needed to minimize risk to military space operations. The orbital safety processes now in place must grow to accommodate the increased use of space by civil and commercial, particularly international, space systems. One option might be to track and catalog space



vehicle near misses similarly to our hazardous air traffic report system and use that information to decide when the risk of maintaining a particular orbit exceeds the costs of traversing into a new orbit. Another option is to develop a joint civil-military, on-orbit collision avoidance process to reduce collisions by predicting high probability conjunctions, then warn operators of impending collisions.

Our space-based infrared system consolidates the Department of Defense's nonimaging infrared systems that fulfill national security needs in areas of missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace characterization. A significant portion of this system is planned for the

low earth orbit where most space debris occurs. In the posture statement presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee last March, Gen. Estes stated, "SBIRS low [space-based infrared system low] is critical to a full national missile defense capability and improved capabilities in major mission areas." This system is going into low earth orbit, an orbit which potentially has high risk for collision. If the Air Force is going to operate and depend on a system such as this—and where civil space activity is predicted to increase—the orbital safety process needs to be strengthened to counter the risks threatening systems such as space-based infrared systems.

The expansive eruption of

telecommunications satellites in orbit has already begun with mobile communications systems such as Iridium by Motorola, Loral's Globalstar, TRW's Odyssey, and Teledesic by Boeing and Microsoft. The Teledesic network plans to insert 840 satellites into low earth orbit. This past September, the Iridium telecommunications constellation was at the 50 percent mark with a total of 34 out of a planned 66 units in orbit. To maintain optimum protection of space assets, we must continually deploy sound orbital safety programs and operationalize sound debris minimization, collision avoidance, and collision warning processes. ♦



# ORI 2000

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## AMC's New Inspection Concept



On Oct. 1, 1997, the Air Mobility Command inspector general began implementing a new inspection concept—ORI 2000, the operational readiness inspection of the future. The Chief of Staff Blue Ribbon Commission, in conjunction with AMC command guidance, provided the catalyst for the re-engineering efforts. ORI 2000 is the result of a five-month, bottom-up review of AMC operational readiness inspections. It incorporates new initiatives and ideas like assessing sustained performance during real-world activities and exercises, evaluating employment using data, lengthening inspection cycles, sampling, and evaluating a unit's ability to survive and operate using a "base X" concept. The changes to the inspection process reflected in ORI 2000 more productively use personnel, cut costs, and make more aircraft available for AMC and its customers.

Despite the changes, the fundamentals remain the same. Our inspections will still be

single phase, evaluating the four major graded areas: initial response, employment, mission support, and ability to survive and operate. We will continue to use the Air Force five-level rating scale: outstanding, excellent, satisfactory, marginal, and unsatisfactory. Also, employment will remain 50 percent of the overall grade.

ORI 2000 is based on four major conceptual changes. The AMC commander expressed confidence in his units' ability to perform their wartime mission, leading to the extension of the inspection cycle to three years for active duty and five years for Air Force Reserve Command and the Air National Guard. This change alone minimizes the inspection footprint significantly.

The second major change emphasizes sustained operations over surge. Instead of grading employment missions flown from a deployed location during a two- to four-day period during the inspection, the units' mission execution grade will be based on their

day-to-day contribution to AMC's mission. Units will be assessed using data obtained from the global decision support system, command and control information processing system, or airlift information reporting system. We will analyze scheduled vs. actual air-land mission data including home station departure, first station arrival, and closure data. Airdrop, air refueling, and assault landing data will be tracked by the units and provided to our inspection team. All of the data will be collected prior to the inspection during a four-month window for active duty and six-month window for AFRC and ANG units. The length of these windows will allow us enough "samples" to make accurate assessments of the units' employment capability.

A benefit to giving units credit for their day-to-day operations and real-world missions will be fewer aircraft required at the forward operating locations during the inspections. The units still demonstrate their ability to generate



U.S. Air Force photo.

and deploy aircraft and support forces from home stations during initial response. AFRC and ANG units can expect to deploy approximately 300 to 400 personnel while active duty units can expect to deploy 400 to 500. Aircraft not needed at the forward operating base will return home or to the mobility system. With flying now being assessed during real-world missions, units can reinvest the flying time associated with operational readiness exercises and inspections in revenue-generating mobility mission and training sorties.

The third major change will allow units to use a local training area at their base—base X—as the forward operating location. Units will still load and launch their aircraft, but using a base X will allow units to function with a smaller support tail, save funds usually spent flying large portions of the unit to another installation, and allow units to practice more often in small groups. If a local base X is not available to them, one of the combat readiness training centers, like

Savannah, Ga., or Volk Field, Wis., or another unit's base X may be used.

Our fourth major change involves a philosophical shift in the way we evaluate a unit's ability to survive and operate, otherwise known as ATSO. AMC is in the early stages of this command-wide training program. This, coupled with nonstandardized, unit-developed training programs, has resulted in some relatively weak scores during inspections. The AMC inspector general will now train the unit during the first half of the ability to survive and operate scenario. Exercises will occur much as they did in the past except that after an attack there will be a short critique period. Units will be expected to "fine-tune" their efforts based on inspector general input. During the second half of a forward operating location activities, a unit's ability to survive and operate will then be evaluated. Once the command's training program reaches maturity, we will stop training ability to survive and operate during inspections.

ORI 2000 also encompasses minor changes in core compliance areas, command special interest items, and en route inspections for support units.

We will evaluate core compliance areas as before but will send checklists to the unit so they can conduct a self-inspection prior to our arrival. We will validate the results and assign a pass or fail grade. Special

interest items will be evaluated in a similar way.

Because of their importance to the AMC mission, we will inspect en route support units as part of the en route inspection process. Air mobility elements, tanker airlift control elements, and aerial ports belonging to AMC operations groups and support squadrons will be inspected during host base operational readiness inspections, Joint Chief of Staff exercises, or during contingency operations. This will allow us to grade them as they perform their wartime mission.

To assist with the transition to ORI 2000, we will dispatch an advance team 180 days prior to a unit's inspection to brief changes in major graded areas and specific details on data collection during the employment window. This will help ensure there are no big surprises prior to and during a unit's inspection.

ORI 2000 represents a major shift in the way AMC will conduct inspections in the future. It's a "work in progress" but the bottom line is we will reduce some of the high operations and personnel tempo AMC is experiencing and also reduce exercise and inspection costs. Innovative programs such as ORI 2000 will allow our command to continually and effectively evaluate unit readiness while still providing world-class support to our air mobility customers. ♦



# Inspecting Contract Quality Assurance

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**D**o you have a sound understanding of contract quality assurance?

If you're an inspector general team member, regardless of your functional area, the answer had better be "yes." Base activities that were accomplished by blue suiters and Air Force civilians are now likely being performed by a contractor. This outsourcing trend is likely to increase substantially as the Air Force continues to squeeze its operations and maintenance budget to fund modernization programs.

Air Force Space Command is no stranger to outsourcing. To date, the command has outsourced 44 percent of its base operating support work-force authorizations and projects this number to rise to 56 percent by the year 2000. Even more revealing, when the base operating support activities prohibited from being outsourced, like fire fighting and security forces, are excluded, approximately

88 percent of the remaining work-force positions in AFSPC will be outsourced by 2000.

This shift in reliance on the private sector for base operating support activities has caused a corresponding shift in an inspector's responsibility. Now, an inspector must be a functional area expert and also understand the business relationship between the Air Force and contractor.

The contract forms the basis of the rights and responsibilities of the Air Force and the contractor for any outsourced activity. Quality assurance is an area that receives particular attention in service contracts for operating support. Service contracts, unlike supply or construction contracts, have no tangible end product that can be assessed to verify that it meets contract specifications. Therefore, a sound quality assurance system is crucial in determining whether the Air Force is receiving the services for which it contracted.

The Federal Acquisition Regulation and its supplements, Air Force Instruction 63-504, *Quality Assurance Evaluator Program*, and Air Force Manual 64-108, *Service Contracts*, provide contract quality assurance guidance and direction. AFSPC has used these and other quality assurance policies to develop AFSPC Space Inspection Guide 90-246, *Contract Quality Assurance*. Space inspection guides assist AFSPC inspectors when inspecting a particular activity. See "The AFSPC QAFA" in the September-October 1996 issue of *TIG Brief* for a detailed discussion of these guides.


Usually a space inspection guide applies to a particular functional area. Space Inspection Guide 90-246, however, can be used by any AFSPC inspector if the inspected activity is contracted out. An inspector's functional area guide assists the inspector in determining whether or not the activity is being performed correctly. Space Inspection Guide 90-246 helps determine whether or not the Air Force quality assurance program for this activity is sound.

If a contracted activity deficiency is found, the inspector must determine

whether this deficiency is the contractor's or the Air Force's responsibility. To make this determination, the inspector must refer to the performance work statement or statement of work found in the contract. The statement delineates the specific services the contractor is required to provide. If the task is not required by the performance work statement, then the Air Force, not the contractor, is at fault.

These are but a few examples of the unique

challenges an inspector might face when inspecting a contracted activity. These challenges will increase in importance and frequency as the Air Force continues to emphasize outsourcing as a budget-saving tool. As an inspector, your understanding of contract quality assurance will be critical to ensuring the Air Force is getting what it pays for as outsourcing plays a greater role in redefining daily operations within the Air Force. ♦





# The Waiver Game

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During my tenure on the Air Force Space Command inspector general team, I have been fortunate to inspect every wing within this command. During these inspections, I have always been impressed with the quality of people and how hard they work. As a general rule, people make a concerted effort to do what their guidance requires them to do. During our inspections, however, we always find a few areas where, for whatever reason, people have not done what they are required to do. When I talk to them about this, I see a recurring problem that must be addressed.

When we ask people why they are not fulfilling a requirement, some of the reasons they give us are understandable;

insufficient resources and new or misunderstood requirements are some of the common reasons we hear. Members often submit waivers to instructions based on their specific circumstances but never receive approval. In cases where the waiver request is not yet approved or not approved by an appropriate authority, problems may arise.

Simply submitting a waiver request is *not* the same as having an approved waiver to guidance. A waiver *request* does not mean you are exempt. You are only exempt from the requirements levied upon you when you have an *approved written waiver from the authority responsible for that guidance*. A staff package which the applicable major command



directorate *thinks* is a good idea but has not yet been approved, does not suffice.

When requesting waivers to guidance, you must keep in mind that except in specific cases, only those who issued the original guidance, in other words, the office of primary responsibility, can issue a valid waiver. For example, a wing cannot normally waive major command guidance. Remember: if they didn't write it, they can't waive it. Additionally, if you didn't write it, you can't waive it. Units must ensure any supplement written at the wing level does not provide less restrictive guidance than higher headquarters.

A recent Air Force-level special interest item, specifically Air Force item number 96-002, *Policy and Guidance Review Validation*, requested inspector general teams review publications to ensure they were not less restrictive than higher headquarters guidance. The vast majority of publications we examined within AFSPC were at least as restrictive as higher headquarters

guidance and, therefore, met the

requirements. In a few isolated cases, wing publications provided less restrictive guidance that created some significant problem areas for the wing. An example: In AFSPC, *all* mission-ready space operators are required to receive training at least quarterly to maintain currency. This training typically consists of some weapon system and emergency procedural training as well as written testing conducted at least monthly. In the incorrect guidance, the operations group exempted instructors who developed the training, in effect waiving the Headquarters AFSPC requirement for all mission-ready crew members to receive this training. This improper guidance created delinquency problems at several squadrons and adversely affected the wing. The moral here is to be very careful when writing waivers or supplements—you can easily cause problems for your customers.

There are a few general guidelines that should keep you and your unit out of trouble:

**1** Before requesting a waiver to higher headquarters guidance, ensure you request it from the appropriate authority. The office of primary responsibility listed on the front of the publication is

usually a good place to start.


**2** When you receive an approved waiver, read it carefully and ensure it is from an appropriate authority. Also, read it for clarity—everything you requested may not have been approved or waived.

**3** Before you issue a waiver, ask yourself if you have the authority to do so. Are you the office of primary responsibility for the publication or did it grant you authority to issue the specific waiver your subordinate unit requested? If the answer is no, do not issue a waiver.

**4** Ensure any supplement you write does not provide guidance less restrictive than the parent publication. The easiest way to complete this is to request the office of primary responsibility's coordination on your supplement.

**5** Does the waiver save resources that can't be replaced or risked? If not, do it!

Keep these tips in mind and chances are you or your subordinate units will be in much better shape next time an inspector general team walks into your work center. ♦



# The Future of Air Force Space Command Inspections

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Imagine. You've just gone through a unit compliance inspection and received a satisfactory rating. You aggressively fixed all identified deficiencies and incorporated all the inspector general recommended changes. On your next inspection, an operational readiness inspection, you again received a satisfactory rating. The improvements you made to your programs based on the recommendations the inspector general made the *last* time were not inspected because the focus had completely changed. Under Air Force Space Command's previous inspection system, units received a different inspection every 12 months. One year, AFSPC inspection

personnel would conduct a unit compliance inspection, formerly known as the Quality Air Force assessment, followed in the next inspection cycle by an operational readiness inspection. Intercontinental ballistic missile units also received a nuclear surety inspection in conjunction with either of these two. Under this inspection system, units spent six months to a year preparing for an inspection nothing like the previous one. AFSPC inspectors often completed their two-year tour without conducting the same type of inspection twice. Reinventing the wheel became common because there was little or no continuity among inspectors.

## Operational Readiness Inspection



Under AFSPC's new inspection system, inspectors will conduct the same inspection *every time*. The new inspection program is designed to do a number of things. First, we are standardizing the scoring method for all the command's mission areas. This was not done when the missile units were integrated into AFSPC. The new inspection program is designed to reduce the "snapshot in time" report and subsequent decrease in productivity at a unit following an inspection. In addition, the new program eliminates the requirement to review programs that, while very important, do not impact the unit's mission directly. Neither does the

## Former Inspection System

### Unit Compliance Inspection

AFSPC inspection include programs, which receive in-depth reviews by other agencies, such as when an environmental compliance and management program inspection is completed at a unit.

The new inspection program in many respects is nearly identical to the operational readiness inspection of past years. During the inspection, unit readiness is still assessed in the four major graded areas of initial response, employment, mission support, and ability to survive and operate. The new inspection also addresses compliance issues but only those that directly relate to the Air Force's common core criteria and are

deemed critical to the unit mission by AFSPC leadership.

The new inspection will be two-phased. The first phase is often a no-notice or limited-notice inspection—no more than 72 hours in advance.

During this phase, a small number of inspectors will visit a wing for three to five days, watching a real-world launch and participating in a major exercise or other activities.

Phase one will be followed by a second phase within 90 days when the team will assess the remaining major graded areas and any required compliance items. This compliance assessment focuses only on designated mission-essential areas and the Air Force common core criteria. The inspector general will rate each compliance area either “in compliance” or “not in compliance.” Rating

compliance in this manner simplifies the rating system and minimizes subjectivity.

Conducting the same inspection every time has several benefits over the previous system. It provides unit and

## New Inspection System

### Phase 1

No-notice or limited-notice inspection for 3 to 5 days.

Observes real-world launch and unit participation in a major exercise or other activities.

### Phase 2

Occurs within 90 days of phase one.

Assess remaining major graded areas and required compliance items.

AFSPC leadership with a consistent report card as we plan to inspect approximately every 18 months. We are looking to a no-notice, mission-focused inspection to reduce or eliminate unit ramp-up and the “paint the rock syndrome” we have seen in the past and to encourage concentration on a unit’s day-to-day mission. As we improve our assessment process by standardizing measuring a wing’s ability to perform its day-to-day mission vice the “snapshot in time” inspections of the past, we hope to reduce our presence at the units. ♦



# Leading the Way to Lightning Protection

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**L**ightning protection and grounding protection systems are hot issues

throughout the Air Force, especially with regard to their impact on nuclear surety. Lightning and grounding protection system issues are also gaining in significance Air Force wide as high value communications and weapon systems come on line. Protecting these systems in an era of budget and personnel cutbacks is imperative.

Air Force Space Command's civil engineering for facilities recently held a meeting to address nuclear surety deficiencies identified during inspections at F. E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo., and Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont. Although these two bases were used as examples, they are by no means the only ones with protection system problems.

"AFSPC civil engineer craftsmen and responsible engineers now require certification on lightning and grounding protection systems."

Deficiencies discussed included improper installation of the intrusion detection system, fire alarms, and computer and communications equipment; lack of surge suppression; and contractor maintenance that degraded lightning and grounding protection. Responsibility for system maintenance and interfacing with command points of contact, and for mending conflicting and confusing instructions related to lightning and ground protection was also addressed.

Recent inspections revealed how imperative it is that the systems' users have an understanding of lightning and grounding protection systems.

tion systems, civil engineering is responsible for maintaining and testing these systems. AFSPC civil engineer craftsmen and responsible engineers now require certification on lightning and grounding protection systems. By Jan. 1, 1998, each AFSPC base will be required to have a certifier. This certifier will be responsible for certifying other individuals at their base after trainees have been to the AFSPC civil engineering facility's lightning and grounding protection systems class.

"While it is imperative that users have an understanding of lightning and grounding protection systems, civil engineering is responsible for maintaining and testing these systems."

"If you own buildings that require system protection, you must ensure they are inspected by civil engineers after any repairs or modifications are made to them that might have impacted the systems."

If you own buildings that require system protection, you must ensure they are inspected by civil engineers after any repairs or modifications are made to them that might have impacted the systems. For example, if communications installs new computers or phone lines, civil engineers should inspect the systems to ensure no grounding or bonding requirements were bypassed.

While it is imperative that users have an understanding of lightning and grounding protec-

The Air Force has begun using the Army lightning and grounding protection systems class. Although this training is open to all major commands, the majority of attendees have been from AFSPC. Classes are taught at different AFSPC bases including Peterson Air Force Base, Colo.; Patrick Air Force Base, Fla.; and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. The class covers guidance from National Fire Protection Association 780, *Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection*

*Systems*, to Air Force Instruction 32-1065, *Grounding Systems*. Initial sessions have been extremely well received. AFSPC estimates that it will have sent 120 people within the command to the protection systems class as of this month.

As alluded to earlier, lightning and grounding protection systems instructions are primarily written for civil engineers. The number of instructions pertaining to these systems is daunting. A basic working knowledge of the systems' fundamentals will enable shop chiefs and building custodians to identify deficiencies. To provide clear guidance on both systems, the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency is finalizing major command input for incorporation into a handbook. Air Force Instruction 32-1065 will make adherence to this handbook mandatory.

Lightning and grounding protection systems are high profile issues with potential nuclear surety implications. Awareness and education are the keys to identifying and fixing discrepancies before they become a computer, weapon system, or nuclear surety inspection problem at your unit. ♦

# Fraud in the Air Force

## Capt. Steve Murray

AFOSI/PA DSN 297-4728

The Air Force Office of Special Investigations investigates all types of fraud cases against the government. Fraud costs the Air Force millions of dollars annually. Most of our fraud investigations are in the procurement area: product substitution, diversion, mischarging, conflicts of interest, and bribery. Other types of fraud involve military and civilian members who have been caught cheating the Air Force. In these budget-tightening days, the impact of fraud, waste, and abuse is felt throughout the Air Force and we should all accept the responsibility to prevent it at every opportunity. Mutual command and AFOSI support, coupled with teamwork, are essential for successful prevention, detection, and neutralization of fraud. Here are some examples.

### Defective Parts

**Subject:** Alpine Industries

**Synopsis:** The U.S. Government filed a civil false claims suit against Alpine Industries, a

supplier of repaired landing gear bushings for C-5 aircraft. The contract required Alpine to comply with specific heat treatment and surface specifications for the bushing repairs. The AFOSI investigation disclosed these specifications were not met and resulted in 966 defective bushings being sold to the Air Force. Upon learning of the faulty bushings, the Air Force removed the parts from their inventory. Air Force engineers concluded that the use of the defective bushings could have caused landing gear parts to work loose and fall off, compromising the integrity of the landing gear system.

**Result:** Alpine paid the government \$54,374 to settle the suit.

### Fraudulent Basic Allowance for Quarters Claim

**Subject:** Air Force Senior Airman

**Synopsis:** An Air Force senior airman was court-martialed following an AFOSI investigation that disclosed he entered into a marriage of convenience in order to receive with dependent rate basic allowance for quarters entitlements. The senior airman paid a female between \$150 and \$200 a

month to marry him so he could move off base. The female admitted to the marriage but said the marriage was never consummated and that she never lived with the member. In an interview, the subject admitted he married the woman so that he could move off base and draw more money.

**Result:** The senior airman was reduced to airman basic, confined for 10 months, ordered to forfeit all pay and allowances, and given a bad conduct discharge.

### Theft

**Subject:** Defense Commissary Agency Employee

**Synopsis:** A commissary cashier was convicted for stealing funds from the cash drawer of her cash register. An AFOSI investigation caught the cashier removing funds from the cash drawer and placing them in her shoe to remove them from the store. The cashier admitted to the theft when confronted by AFOSI.

**Result:** The cashier was ordered to pay \$15,517 in restitution and received six years of probation. ♦



# Summary of Recent Audits

**Mr. George Mellis**  
AFAA/DOO DSN 426-8041

The Air Force Audit Agency provides professional and independent internal audit service to all levels of Air Force management. The reports summarized here discuss ways to improve the economy, effectiveness, and efficiency of installation-level operations and, therefore, may be useful to you. Air Force officials may request copies of these reports or a listing of recently published reports by contacting Mr. George Mellis at the number above, E-mailing to [reports@af.pentagon.mil](mailto:reports@af.pentagon.mil), or writing to HQ AFAA/DOO, 1125 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1125.

**Contingency Hospital.** AFAA auditors evaluated whether personnel effectively maintained the plans, facilities, and assets required to activate and operate a contingency hospital at an overseas location. Audit assisted management by suggesting improvements for their contingency hospital activation plan, identifying \$2.4 million in excess equipment and supplies, and providing recommendations for improving security

and managing expiration-dated items. Management took several actions during the course of the audit and worked closely with AFAA personnel to find the most appropriate solutions to improve the readiness of the contingency hospital. (*Report of Audit 52297052*)

A recent AFAA audit of a **Pave Hawk rescue squadron's mobility capability** highlighted several planning areas requiring improvement. The unit had not exercised or trained in its most stringent mobility tasking for three years. Consequently, the commander had no assurance the unit was fully capable of meeting its deployment requirements. In addition, 60 personnel were not weapons qualified and another 26 lacked training in either pallet preparation or hazardous material certifications. Finally, the unit was not fully safeguarding every deployable member's no-fee passports. Fully agreeing with the auditor's findings, the commander immediately scheduled a unit deployment/mobility exercise and established needed unit processes to provide more timely training and control no-fee passports. (*Report of Audit 20997022*)

AFAA auditors at an Air Force Materiel Command Test Center reviewed **vehicle fleet requirements** to evaluate whether leased vehicles were efficiently managed. Working with unit


commanders, the auditors pointed out the base could terminate 80 vehicle leases in ten units and save approximately \$306,928 annually. The center commander implemented the auditors recommendations by instructing all unit commanders to review leased vehicles for potential cancellation and strengthening internal controls by establishing procedures to annually review leased vehicle utilization and document the justification to retain leased vehicles. (*Report of Audit 40297023*)

**Management of Food Services.** AFAA auditors evaluated controls over food service dining hours and meal estimates at an Air Force Space Command installation. An analysis of meal serving hours identified periods of time when dining hall meal utilization was minimal. Graphs were provided in the audit report identifying serving periods which should be deleted and those which should be added. In addition, a comparison of actual meals served to government estimates showed a variance ranging from 59 to 99 percent. The commander immediately implemented audit recommendations and reduced future annual contract costs by \$127,000. (*Report of Audit 50797024*) ♦


# Tracking Recent Inspections

The following are the most recent Air Force Inspector General's Acquisition Management Review and Functional Management Review reports. The information in this section is general in nature and contains only the purpose and scope of the reviews. We do not include specific findings or recommendations because they are privileged information.


These reports are privileged documents of the secretary of the Air Force and for official use only. Our policy is not to transmit them by E-mail because the information would travel on unsecure systems. However, Air Force organizations may request a copy of acquisition management review reports by calling Ms. Melissa Stratton at DSN 246-1672, [strattom@kafb.saia.af.mil](mailto:strattom@kafb.saia.af.mil), or writing her at HQ AFIA/AI; 9700 G Avenue SE, Suite 380D; Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5670. Air Force organizations may request a copy of functional management review reports by calling Mr. Gary Willis at DSN 246-1917, E-mailing him at [willisg@kafb.saia.af.mil](mailto:willisg@kafb.saia.af.mil), or writing him at HQ AFIA/FO; 9700 G Avenue SE, Suite 363A; Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5670. Agencies outside the Air Force desiring a copy of any of these reports should contact SAF/IGI by dialing DSN 227-5119 or commercial (703) 697-5119.



Functional Management Review of Quality Contract Aircraft Maintenance, PN 96-603, assessed the quality and effectiveness of contract aircraft maintenance performed on U.S. Air Force aircraft. The team reviewed Air Force and multi-command regulation policy and guidance for adequacy; assessed the Air Force's ability to ensure contractor compliance with multi-command regulation's 00-20-series technical orders and procedures; and determined the Air Force's ability to ensure the contractor safely and reliably met operational commitments. (*HQ AFIA/FOL, Chief Master Sgt. Terence W. Wolfe, DSN 246-2081*)



Functional Management Review of Air Force Life Support Program, PN 96-612, determined the effectiveness of the Air Force Life Support Program. The teams assessed Air Force and major command guidance, policies, and procedures; management and funding process for life support equipment and technical orders; process for forecasting, tracking, and managing time change requirements and service life extension components; process for funding and acquisition of new life support equipment; and effectiveness of the life support officer at the major command and unit level. (*HQ AFIA/FOL, Chief Master Sgt. Terence W. Wolfe, DSN 246-2081*)



Functional Management Review of Personnel Accountability, PN 97-607, assessed the effectiveness of personnel accountability during contingency of exercise deployments in support of rapid global mobility and agile combat support. While personnel accountability at base level and deployed locations was good, at the Air Force level personnel accountability processes were ineffective. All commanders felt the personnel system did not support their needs so they often created their own systems which did not interface with the Air Force system. These stand-alone "in-house systems" required continuous reconciliation with the personnel data system and manpower and personnel, and contributed to inaccurate information provided to senior Air Force commanders. In addition, there was inadequate guidance for deploying civilians and no guidance for contractors. Also, the Air National Guard and Air Force

# Tracking Recent Inspections

Reserve Command, at times, circumvented the personnel system in the deployment process resulting in Reserve component forces not accounted for in the personnel system. (*HQ AFIA/FOS, Lt. Col. Dorothy L. Baltes, DSN 246-2192*)

Functional Management Review of Evaluation of Financial Services Office Effectiveness, PN 97-603, assessed financial services office effectiveness in providing military and civilian pay allowances, military and civilian travel reimbursement, cashier operations, and accounting liaison duties with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. The team evaluated office organizational structure, experience levels, and training programs to determine their capability to fulfill mission requirements. The team reviewed policy and guidance and analyzed performance metrics during interviews with air staff-level, major command and base-level financial management. They also interviewed comptroller and financial services for perceptions of their effectiveness. (*HQ AFIA/FOS, Capt. Joseph L. Baca, DSN 246-2078*)

Functional Management Review of the Management of War Reserve Materiel Vehicles and Support Equipment, PN 96-607, determined the effectiveness of war reserve materiel vehicle and support equipment management and assessed the readiness condition of these assets. The team reviewed headquarters and major command guidance to assess management of resources. They also interviewed base-level war reserve materiel vehicle and support equipment managers, transportation planners, and collateral planning activities to determine the level of involvement with sustainment and assets operation. The team examined stockpile storage and maintenance within the continental United States and overseas to determine storage conditions and whether the type and location of storage affects the capability to retrieve assets for contingency support. Internal control systems were evaluated to determine if accountability is maintained and usage of stocks is predicated by operational necessity. (*HQ AFIA/CVP, Lt. Col. Reynald R. Lops, DSN 246-1864*)

Functional Management Review of the Effect of the Munitions and Aircraft Maintenance Officer Career Fields Consolidation on Specialized Munitions Experience, PN 96-604, assessed the effect of the maintenance officer career fields consolidation and determined if the Air Force is building an officer base to satisfy critical duties in munitions, weapons safety, and nuclear surety positions. The team examined the suitability of training provided through the Aircraft Maintenance Officer Course at Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas, safety training at the Air Force Safety School at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, and follow-on training at squadron and wing level. The team used the position designators by major commands to identify assignments with specific munitions, weapons safety, and nuclear surety requirements and the process to select officers for these positions. The team reviewed munitions, weapons safety, and nuclear surety knowledge base through interviews with officers at all assignment echelons; the depth of safety and nuclear surety issues reflected in safety and surety inspections; and examined the retention percentages of qualified officers to satisfy needs in command and senior positions directing munitions, weapons safety, and nuclear surety activities. (*HQ AFIA/FOL, Chief Master Sgt. Bruce D. Tunsil, DSN 246-2079*) ♦

# Mental Health Services: Front-line Tools for Air Force Leaders

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**M**ental health services is modernizing to meet the current needs of all levels of Air Force leadership. Changes represent a shift from a traditional medical service delivery model—"the patient is sick"—to a prevention-oriented approach—"help this person keep from becoming a patient." Mental health clinics are assigned to base medical organizations and are comprised of three components: psychotherapeutic services, family advocacy, and substance abuse treatment. In each component, the trend is

moving away from allocating resources for problem solving and moving toward placing those resources in prevention activities. This trend is evidenced by the recent creation of programs such as critical incident stress debriefing teams, suicide prevention programs, reorganization of the drug testing program, and increased protection for communication between client and provider.

The result of this shift in service delivery is more user-friendly, readily available tools at each commander's disposal.

Although mental health clinic mission statements may vary base to base, the consistent goal is to support unit and major command mission requirements, especially in terms of a fit, rapidly deployable force. In a July 31, 1997 letter to all Air Force commanders, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman said, "Mental health professionals are one of several front-line helping resources. If you view them as the resource of last resort, you have probably missed the best opportunity to intervene with a positive result."

Trained mental health professionals consist of psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, mental health nurses, and substance abuse counselors. They work in cooperation with family support centers, chaplains, "put prevention into practice" activities, and other installation support groups to design installation-specific programs to address problems in the populations they serve. The effectiveness of these programs is largely dependent on support and feedback from leaders.

Mental health clinics still provide traditional assessments and treatment of crisis problems such as suicide intervention, alcohol-related incidents, the personnel reliability program, commander-directed evaluations, domestic violence,



and individual or group therapy. These services typically represent “last resort” options for addressing problems that are often difficult to resolve. Certainly, a well designed, targeted prevention program at the squadron or group level is more cost effective and time efficient than eight or more therapy sessions and possible hospitalization or discharge from the service.

Likely, the best known mental health service available to commanders is the family advocacy program. Extensive resources are made available to installation commanders to administer this program. Air Force personnel are often unaware that in addition to domestic violence intervention, the family advocacy program provides a variety of programs targeted to new and single parents, teen mothers, and those with anger-control problems. Frequently underutilized, program personnel are talented, highly trained individuals and teams equipped to tailor services to meet specific needs at the request of commanders.

Until several years ago, substance abuse services were part of the base social actions program. Now under the mental health umbrella with expanded responsibilities, social actions still works with commanders relative to alcohol and substance abuse problems. Evaluation and treatment plans are

still coordinated with commanders but increased emphasis on prevention for active duty members and their dependents is now a key activity. Substance abuse counselors are prepared to give briefings at all levels—schools, spouse groups, top-three meetings, commanders calls, and other forums. They frequently work with commanders, first sergeants, base education personnel, and spouse and youth groups to identify and prevent potential substance abuse problems.

The demand reduction program is another drug prevention tool for Air Force personnel. Its main emphasis is to assist the youth of Air Force families in avoiding drug abuse. The program includes a mandatory drug-testing program for civilian and active duty personnel described in Air Force Instruction 44-120, *Drug Abuse Testing Program*, in addition to providing anti-drug programs for Air Force beneficiaries. If the commander has any concern about a substance abuse issue, he or she should call either the substance abuse program director or any of the technicians for consultation.

“Mental health professionals are one of several front-line helping resources. If you view them as the resource of last resort, you have probably missed the best opportunity to intervene with a positive result.”

Suicide is the third leading cause of death among 15- to 24-year olds.\*

\* Information gathered from the general population.

Of the three mental health components mentioned, the most sweeping changes have occurred in the psychotherapeutic services area. During the past decade, a philosophical shift from individual, long-term therapy to brief, problem-focused therapy took place in the civilian sector. The same is true in the Air Force. The results have brought about a savings of Air Force medical resources and less time away from the duty station for members.

Two new prevention programs are or will be required by Air Force Instruction 44-153, *Critical Incident Stress Management*, and Air Force Instruction 44-154, *Suicide Prevention Education and Community Training*. The former is directed at preventing adjustment and post-traumatic stress disorders. Personal events such as an unexpected death in the immediate family or community disasters such as the Oklahoma City bombing incident can be causes of these debilitating disorders. Drawing in part from lessons learned in Oklahoma, significant personnel down time can be avoided by early entry into the mental health arena using critical incident stress debriefings. Air Force Instruction 44-154 provides Air Force leaders with the resources they need to train middle- and first-level managers and co-workers to recognize the signs and symptoms of potential suicide and provide

for professional-level intervention before a potentially life-threatening event occurs.

Recent landmark changes cited in Air Force instruction 44-109, *Mental Health and Military Law*, now make information given to a mental health provider by an Air Force member who is placed in the limited privilege suicide prevention program exempt from use in criminal proceedings under certain conditions. See paragraph three of the instruction for details. In the

“... over 30 percent of completed suicides were involved in some type of legal problem or were under investigation.”



past, any comment made during a mental health interview could be used as evidence in either legal or administrative actions or both. Thus, legal counsel often advised their clients against speaking with a clinical therapist. Now, after a member has been notified of the commander's intent to impose punishment pursuant to Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice **or** has had court-martial charges preferred **and** has been placed in the limited privilege suicide prevention program, the information given to mental health providers cannot be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding or to characterize a discharge. This change addresses a recent review of Air Force suicide rates which revealed more than 30 percent of completed suicides were involved in some type of legal problem or were under investigation. Currently, if a commander suspects a member may present a risk of suicide, he or she may refer the member to the mental health clinic for support without the individual placed in the program fearing further incrimination.

Unit-specific stress management briefings or workshops are available to commanders having concerns such as a high operations tempo. Mental health personnel have been key players in preparing families for base closures. In addition, mental health staff members serve on hostage negotiation

teams and aircraft mishap investigation boards, serve as expert witnesses for discharge boards and courts-martial, and participate in installation and unit readiness planning committees. They can also be indispensable to commanders in a rapid deployment situation by providing support, briefings, and consultation to local leaders and military members and their dependents.

In a later paragraph of the letter to commanders previously cited, Gen. Fogleman stated, "Effective leaders are in touch with their people and know when they have personal problems before they become crises. Even more, effective leaders unequivocally communicate to their subordinates, 'It's okay to get help.'"<sup>\*</sup> Historically, people have been concerned that asking for help is a career-ending request. Each commander needs to make a concerted effort, via written policies, spoken words, and observable actions, to show that asking for help in the early stages of a problem will not terminate careers. Members will only avail themselves of prevention programs as they become aware of their exist-

**"... effective leaders unequivocally communicate to their subordinates, 'It's okay to get help.'"**

ence, trust that attendance will not harm future career advancement, and believe that intervention will be helpful. Unit leaders are critical sources of this assurance and encouragement.

Leaders have direct impact on the unit climate and acceptance of any prevention program. As they are successful in making members aware of mental health services and then foster a climate of trust and belief, commanders and supervisors will find their local mental health clinic a front-line tool to use in the pursuit of mission accomplishment and readiness. ♦

**Eighty-three suicides occur every day—one every 17 minutes.\***

**\* Information gathered from the general population.**

# Did you know?

IGLINK is a “one stop shop” for all major command or forward operating agencies inspectors general web pages. It has information on inquiries, best practices, inspection results, and schedules. IGLINK can be found on the Air Force Inspection Agency’s homepage at [www-afia.saia.af.mil](http://www-afia.saia.af.mil).